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In 1903 a private commission of Rand compound managers visited the Kimberley 
diamond mine compounds "with a view to the application of their system to the 
Witwatersrand mines if deemed advantageous". (1) The commission went to the 
diamond mines because of Kimberley's reputation for model compounds. It was 
commonly believed by mine owners and others that good accommodation, food and 
health care for African miners were responsible, in part, for keeping up the full 
complement of the De Beers work force. Unlike on the Rand, there was no major 
shortage of labour in Kimberley after the war. "The De Beers Company have set an 
example of just and reasonable treatment of their Native employees", wrote Outlook, 
famous organ of Christian mission opinion, in 1906, 
which might with advantage be followed at other South 
African labour centres. What has been done at 
Kimberley could be done elsewhere and it is 
unfortunate that in other great labour centres the 
employers do not take the same view of their 
responsibilities. (2) 
The Rand compound managers did, at least, learn from their visit to Kimberley. 
They recommended the construction of "Ideal compounds" on the Rand on the basis of 
what they saw at the diamond mines. Thus, the Kimberley compounds provided a model 
of social welfare for compounds on the Rand. 
After the war the new British administration in the Transvaal was l 
concerned over the high rate of African mortality on the gold mines. In 1903 it I 
reached 71.25 deaths per thousand and had been as bad, if not worse, in the 1890s. (3) 
"I do not see1', wrote Lyttelton, the Colonial Secretary, to Lord Milner, Governor 
l of the Transvaal, "how a death rate of between 50 and 100 per thousand can be , 
defended . . .l1. (4) This mortality rate became an important issue in the debate 1 
over the introduction of Chinese workers to the Rand mines. Milner did all he 1 
could to improve compound conditions in view of the British and Chinese governments1 
negotiations over the conditions regulating the importation of Chinese into the 
Transvaal. (5) Rand mine doctors believed that the death rate could be reduced to I 
40 per thousand and, it seems, this was acceptable to Lyttelton. (6) The mine 
doctors and compound managers introduced improvements in the matters of sanitation, l 
impervious floors, open stoves, diet, housing and hospitals. (7) As a result the I 
mortality rate dropped to 42.62 per thousand in 1904 but thereafter failed to match 
the lower Kimberley death rate, which averaged 19.78 between 1903 and 1912. (8) l I
l 
l 
Rhodesian mine managers also looked to Kimberley for a model for their I 
compounds. A Rhodesian representative joined the Rand compound commission when it l l 
visited Kimberley in 1903. (9) But Southern Rhodesian compounds derived no immediate 1 
benefit from this experience. In fact, van Onselen has azgued that the Rhodesian l 
mines had "for many year4 an even more appalling health record than the Rand . . . ll. (10) 
Standards of health cannot, of course, be simply assessed by the death rate. But it 
i s  an immediate indicator of physical welfare that  can be measured. A t  i ts  worst 
the African death ra te  on Southern Rhodesian mines wsa 75.94 per thousand i n  1906. 
But it did steadily improve over the next th i r ty  years. The death ra te  was highest 
between 1906 and 1915 when an average of 43.40 per thousand Africans died on the 
mines each year. (11) And the causes of death were quite clear. "The greatest 
k i l l e r s  of a l l  on Rhodesian mines", wrote van Onselen, "were diseases which could be 
directly attributable to the inadequate diet  and poor standards of accommodation fo r  
workers." (12) Pneumonia, as at Kimberley and the Rand, accounted fo r  the greatest 
proportion of deaths. And pneumonia was a "disease of employment" which was found 
comparatively rarely i n  the r u r a l  labour catchment areas of Southern and Central 
Africa. (13) 
The culpability fo r  mortality on the Katangan copper mines i s  l e s s  clear. 
"It is, of course, impossible to  determinev1, wrote Perrings, 
just how much mortality rates among particular age 
groups were increased by the i r  presence on the mines 
since it i s  certain that  even i n  rura l  areas 
mortality was high. (14) 
What i s  clear i s  that  Africans died i n  greater numbers on Katangan mines at the i r  
most dangerous than at any other mining centre i n  southern and central Africa. 
Between 1913 and 1922 the average mortality ra te  was 71.31 per thousand each ye=. (15) 
And these figures conceal sharp variations i n  death ra tes  of different African peoples 
and i n  recruited as opposed t o  voluntary workers. However, i n  the 1920s work and 
compound conditions began to improve. A s  sections of the labour force were 
stabilized there was greater investment i n  medical c m ,  housing and rations. After 
1932 the ra te  of mortality due to  disease remained consistently below 10 per thousand 
each year. (16) Katanga came to  r iva l  Kimberley i n  the humanity of i ts  health record. 
While general improvement i n  the conditions of mine labour occurred a f te r  
an in i t ia l  period of heavy mortality and labour shortage i n  southern and central 
Africa, Kimberley appears to have been an exception to  the rule. Those few scholars 
who have written about Kimberley simply confirm the existence of model compounds 
almost from their  introduction. (17) But what were Kimberley compounds l ike  before 
they underwent fundamental reconstruction i n  1903? Were they the models of social 
welfare that  they were reputed to  be? O r  did they bear more brutal ly the barth marks 
of another model, a model of labour control, the f i r s t  of i ts  kind i n  southern 
Africa and one that  had i n i t i a l l y  l i t t l e  to  do with the welfare of African miners? 
A Model of Social Welfare 
Mining companies began to  introduce closed compounds i n  1885 - f i f t een  years a f te r  
diamonds were f i r s t  mined at Kimberley. For much of these f i r s t  f i f teen years I 
Africans lived i n  open compounds. These compounds simply provided barrack-type 
accommodation fo r  African miners. They provided lodgings fo r  20,000 Africans i n  
thei r  hey-day i n  the early 1880s. Open compounds were enclosed by corrugated-iron 
fences with guarded gates to regulate the movement of African workers. But Africans 
were free to go in to  the locations or townships t o  spend thei r  leisure time on the 
food, drink and pleasure of the i r  choice. The introduction of closed compounds 
ended this freedom. (18) Closed compounds were self-contained institutions. Once an 
African entered a closed compound he l o s t  all access to  the surrounding town for  the 
duration of h i s  contract. Food was sold i n  the compound stores and, i n  time, alcohol 
w a s  prohibited. Africans moved between the mines and compounds through enclosed sub- 
ways. And the large compounds were covered with a f ine wire mesh to prevent parcels 
of stolen diamonds being thrown over the fences. This completed the to ta l  isolation 
1 
of African workers i n  a world of thei r  own. 
l 
By 1889 all African mine workers (10,000) were compounded. (19) Even 
before this process was completed, Gardner W i l l i a m s ,  General Manager of De Beers 
Consolidated Mines Limited, which employed the majority of workers, was convinced 
that they were immense improvements i n  social welfare. "Our natives are bet ter  
housed and bet ter  fed than uncompounded natives1', he told his sharreholders, 
and are bet ter  paid than miners i n  any of the European 
countries. Those unf i t  for work, ei ther through 
sickness or  on account of injuries received i n  the 
mine are taken f ree  of cost i n  the Company's hospital 
which adjoins the compound. There are fewer accidents 
under the present system than there were i n  the open 
workings. A very large majority of the accidents i n  the 
mine is  due e i ther  to  the carelessness or the stupidity 
of the natives themselves. A large percentage of the 
deaths in  the compound had been caused by receiving 
natives who come i n  companies from countries north of 
the Transvaal, many of whom are so s t m d  and emaciated 
as to be beyond help. (20) 
There w a s  much that was questionable i n  this statement. Most questionable was 
Wil l i ams '  understanding of why Africans under his control and care died. 
There is  l i t t l e  doubt that there were more accidents i n  underground mining 
than i n  open working, which had been the system i n  use from 1870 t o  1885 and i n  some 
mines a f t e r  that date. It i s  also clear that  diamond mining had a worse accident ra te  
than gold mining to  the north i n  the i r  first th i r ty  years of development. Some 
s t a t i s t i c s  prove the point. In l a t e  nineteenth century Britain over three persons 
ki l led  per thousand i n  mining was considered unacceptable. (21) On the Witwatersrand 
the death ra te  averaged a l i t t l e  over four per thousand between 1896 and 1905. I n  
Southern Rhodesia the mine death ra te  never went over f ive per thousand between 1907 
and 1933. For the l a t t e r  half of t h i s  period it averaged around two and a half 
deaths per thousand. Worst of all, the Kimberley accident death ra te  was nine and a 
half per thousand between 1881 and 1889, declining to  6.2 per thousand over the 
following decade. (22) 
In  part this high death ra te  was the product of the novel and treacherous 
nature of underground mining i n  diamondiferous ground (called blue). V a s t  caverns 
were excavated i n  the U, transforming the Kimberley and De Beers mines in to  
gigantic honeycombs. The blue l e f t  as p i l l a r s  w a s  inherently unsafe, as it 
disintegrated on exposure to  the atmosphere and to  water. There were also greasy 
sl ides between large blocks of blue, which slipped without warning. Consequently, 
the roofs of underground workings were constant sources of danger. Furthermore, 
fire-damp w a s  a threat while candles were the major means of underground lighting. 
And, finally, mud rushes became the most feared underground hazard, bursting in to  
tunnels and f i l l i n g  them up with terrifying speed. However, despite these manifest 
dangers to  l i f e ,  the Mining Inspector concluded i n  1886 that "the majority of 
employers of labour i n  these mines look upon regulations fo r  safety as mere 
harassing restrictions'!. (23) 
The novel nature of mining and the treacherous quali i e s  of the blue were 
exacerbated by competition t o  increase production i n  the l a t e  1880s. The De Beers 
DBvIC (24) pushed i t s  workers to  the limit to catch up w i t h  the greater productive 
capacity of the Kimberley Central INC so as to  improve i ts  stake i n  the struggle for 
to ta l  control of the four mines. I n  doing so the De Beers management flouted 
safety regulations, with catastrophic result@. (25) In  July 1888, soon a f t e r  the 
formation of De Beers Consolidated, a f i r e  broke out underground i n  De Beers mine. 
Out of a work-force of 67 Europeans and 625 Africans, 24 Europeans and 178 Africans 
died. (26) Such a disaster  played havoc with accident s t a t i s t i c s  and mine managers 
preferred to exclude it and explain it as exceptional. (27) 
Accidents accounted, however, for  only a proportion of the mortality ra te  
a t  the diamond mines. Disease took the l ion's  share of lives. The contribution of 
closed compounds t o  the incidence of disease can best be seen i n  a comparison with 
open compounds. But this has i ts  di f f icul t ies  as l a r  open compounds were i n  the i r  
hey-day during the depression and small-pox epidemic $" 1882-1885). Both depression 
and small-pox exacerbated mortality. And as d l - p o x  drove away labourers i n  fear  
of the i r  l ives  and drove up the price of mining materials, the mine owners, i n  
particular, t r ied  to  conceal the nature of the epidemic and i ts  deadly legacy. The 
mortality s t a t i s t i c s  fo r  this period are, therefore, d is t inct ly  unreliable. (28) 
However, i t  i s  possible to  compare the mortality ra te  i n  the two boom 
periods of the l a t e  1870s and the l a t e  1880s. But f i r s t  some caveats should be made. 
The mortality ra tes  apply to  the whole population and not simply t o  those who worked 
i n  the mines. However, it should be remembered that  the African population was 
overwhelmingly male, that African males were predominantly employed i n  the mining 
industry and that  the death ra te  was highest among African male adults. I n  1878, 
when African miners lived i n  open compounds, the African death r a t e  was 80 per 
thousand. This w a s  "a rate", wrote Dr Matthews, 
which i s  sufficiently large to  rank Kimberley among 
the most unhealthy towns i n  existence. This i s  about 
three times the proportionate ra te  of mortality i n  
London and i s  considerably greater than the average 
number of deaths per 1,000 i n  large and crowded c i t i e s  
of the East. (29) 
But a decade l a t e r  matters were even worse. In  1888, when African miners lived 
largely i n  closed compounds, the African death ra te  w a s  over 100 per thousand. (30) 
This w a s  more than double the Rhodesian death ra te  i n  a comparable period of mining 
development. Even i f  we take in to  account the unreliabil i ty of to ta l  Kimberley 
population figures, we know that  the trend i n  the ea r l i e r  period was towards an 
increase i n  population while the converse w a s  true of the second period. This tends 
to improve the ea r l i e r  but worsens the l a t e r  mortality rate. "The death ra te  i s  not 
as low as  might have been reasonably expectedft, wrote the Registrar of Natives i n  
1888, "especially considering the increased compound accommodati ont1. (31) Thus, 
Gardner W i l l i a m s  was f a r  off the mark i n  his claim that  closed compounds had 
increased the social welfare of African miners. 
Medical practitioners i n  Kimberley advanced three explanations fo r  the 
alarming increase i n  mortality i n  the l a t e  1880s. Fi rs t ly ,  death registration 
improved a f te r  the small-pox epidemic had ended. It w a s  openly admitted that  many 
Africans had died without any of f ic ia l  registration. Consequently, the horror of 
the extent of death i n  Kimberley became public fo r  the f i r s t  time. One Parliamentary 
Commission i n  1887 discovered the fac t  that four convicts were continually employed 
i n  picking up African corpses from the streets ,  while another ten to  th i r ty  were 
employed full-time i n  digging graves. (32) The dead were generally newcomers, who 
had died of " s t m t i o n  and exhaustion", having been driven out of compounds and 
locations by more frequent and rigorous pass raids. (33) Secondly, the accident 
death ra te  doubled a f t e r  the development of underground mining. Admissions to  the 
Kimberley Hospital rose and there w a s  a sharp increase i n  compound fractures among 
the inquries. (34) Thirdly, doctors noticed that  the majority of Africans died of 
pneumonia. And pneumonia deaths were a direct  consequence of changes i n  mining 
production and inadequate compound accommodation. 
This f ina l  point i s  brought in to  sharp re l i e f  through a comparison of the 
causes of death during the two eras of open compounds and open mining and closed 
compounds and underground mining. I n  the former era twice as many Africans died of 
fever, dysentery and d imhoea  as died of bronchitis, pneumonia, p this is  and 
pleurisy. (35) I n  the l a t t e r  period the reverse was true. (36) Dysentery and 
diarrhoea were caused by defective sanitation, while lung diseases were attributable 
to  overcrowded accommodation, poor die t  and inadequate protection against major 
changes i n  temperature, all exacerbated by underground mining. While sanitation and 
public health improved over the 1880s and 1890~3, De Beers did l i t t l e  t o  improve 
thei r  compound accommodation i n  the ten or  more years a f t e r  the company monopolised 
production i n  1889. Throughout the 1890s pneumonia continued to  be the biggest 
k i l l e r  i n  the compounds. "The disease w i l l  continue to be our most serious cause 
of death in  the ordinary course of eventsf1, wrote Dr Stoney i n  1900, "so long as 
overcrowding i n  the compounds continues . . . l l .  (37) 
Closed compounds were more overcrowded than open compounds. Overcrowding 
i n  open compounds had also been a problem but one compound differed from another. 
Some mining companies had achieved acceptable death rates,  while others were cause 
fo r  public disapproval. (38) There was l i t t l e  off ic ia l  regulation of compounds 
besides routine visits from the Sanitazy Inspector. Such limited municipal 
authority was curtailed once De Beers Consolidated had monopolized production. 
Moreover, monopoly i n  production led to  a centralization of compound accommodation. 
I n  1889 there were seventeen compounds for  10,000 Africans. (39) I n  1896 there 
were three compounds fo r  the work force of 5,000 Africans. (40) Thus, as the 
number of compounds had dwindled they had expanded i n  size. The model De Beers 
West End compound covered five acres and contained the much vaunted swimming pool. 
But wide open spaces could not compensate fo r  the congestion i n  the sleeping 
compartments. A t  the beginning of the 1890s De Beers compounds infringed the public 
health minimal standards of 300 cubic feet  per man. (41) The si tuation worsened 
over the decade. Not only did systematic shift-work encourage the i l lus ion that 
accommodation could be provided on shares. While one sh i f t  worked another slept. 
But also a f t e r  1896 the De Beer's work force began to  expand once again without a 
commensurate expansion i n  compound accommodation. Thus, D r  Stoney was compelled to  
comment i n  l 9 O O  that "unti l  they [compounds] were extended and re-modelled with an 
increased air-space, proper l ight ing and impermeable floors, this te r r ib le  disease 
[pneumonia] amongst the natives w i l l  continue i ts  ravageslf. (42) 
l Besides being overcrowded, compounds were also cold. Africans slept  on 
I the ground i n  blankets i n  quarters without doors and with an open space around the 
top of the w a l l s .  While this aided ventilation during sunrmer and during the day, 
it did not exclude the intense cold at night and during winter. Kimberley was ,  and 
l is, notorious for  i ts  savage inversions of temperature. In fact ,  compounds were so 
cold that one commission w a s  told: 
Natives fo r  the night sh i f t  were i n  the habit of 
going down into  the mine early i n  the afternoon 
because it w a s  warmer there than i n  the i r  compound, 
and that they would be about the mine smoking or 
sleeping, but always with lighted candles near them. (43) 
Not only was De Beers parsimonious i n  the quantity of wood supplied, but also added 
insul t  to  injury through the claim that  wood was "freen. Rather, wood was simply 
included i n  the costs of compound maintenance and recovered through the percentage 
placed on the goods bought i n  the compound stores. One government o f f ic ia l  
questioned whether "in the face of the great amount of prof i ts  made out of these 
natives . . . they receive anything fo r  nothing". (44) 
Another service De Beers claimed to  provide "free of costf' was medical 
l care. A review of the history of hospitals i n  Kimberley suggests otherwise. Sick Africans were most often sent to  the Kimberley gaols. Prisons served a number of 
purposes besides thei r  usual fhnction of incarceration. They were flasylums for  
lunatics, hospitals fo r  prisoners and chronic sick paupers and ref'uges fo r  the 
desti tute . . .lf. (45) Their f a c i l i t i e s  were certainly free but medical care was 
m i n i m a l .  Better treatment was available i n  the Kimberley Hospital but i n  the 1880s 
beds fo r  Africans were limited. And this was so despite the fact  that  Africans paid 
a special hospital tax as part  of the fee fo r  the registration of a labour contract. 
This tax, which only Africans paid, provided the largest subsidy to  the Kimberley 
Hospital throughout the 1880s and 1890s. The benefit of this fhnding largely went 
to  white patients. None the less ,  i t  i s  clear that  Africans were ent i t led  to  
medical care, whether i n  mine or  municipal hospitals, i n  return fo r  the 12/- a year 
that  they each paid. (46) 
Were they compensated i n  the mine hospitals fo r  the care they were enti t led 
to a t  the Kimberley Hospital? It seems not. Before monopolization, companies 
varied i n  thei r  standasds of care, ranging from none a t  a l l  i n  the Kimberley Central 
compound to a vis i t ing doctor, dispensary and five or  s i x  nurses i n  the De Beers 
West Fhd compound. (47) But whatever the level of health care, it was worse than 
the improving standards of medicine i n  the Kimberley Hospital. Compound managers 
did not take advantage of this. In  fact ,  hospital authorities complaimd of 
Africans being sent to  them "merely to die". (48) After t h i s  complaint a t  the turn 
of the decade, African workers were sent to Hospital before it  was too l a t e  and the 
Hospital death ra te  declined. However, i n  the 1890s, as security i n  compounds was 
tightened against diamond theft ,  all  African mine workers were treated i n  compound 
hospitals. And it i s  i n  the mine hospital deaths that  a clear-cut mortality ra te  
can be established. For there are no problems with an unreliable to ta l  population 
figure. Thus, between 1897 and.1902 the average annual African death ra te  i n  the 
diamond mines was 64.62 per thousand. (49) Although this w a s  an improvement on the 
to ta l  (and therefore not s t r i c t l y  comparable) death r a t e  i n  the 18808, i t  was  poor 
compared to the considerable improvements effected a f t e r  1903. 
An inadequate die t  contributed to  this high death rate. Diamond workers 
were not rationed, as were black miners i n  Southern Rhodesia. They had to  p w  for  
thei r  food individually or i n  food clubs and cook it themselves, or  have it cooked 
for  them by injured Africans unable to do mine work. There was  a simple management 
reason for  this. "I f  you were to  rat ion the natives", said Francis "Matabele" 
Thompson, De Beers compound manager, 
you would ei ther find them al l  sick, or  not wanting 
to work, because they would get thei r  food all  the 
same, whereas now they say we must work to  get food. (50) 
But often work was not available as more workers were compounded than were required 
for a f u l l  work force. In  addition, management determined the price of food and the 
level of wages. Management control of work, wages and food prices ensured that  a 
portion of the African work force was consistently undernourished. 
In  summary, then, the model of social welfare provided by Kimberley's 
compounds before 1903 was a poor one. After th i r ty  years and more of diamond mining 
and f i f teen under the closed compound system, African mortality was still  
unacceptably high. Sanitation had improved and a section of the African work force 
had become acclimatized and accustomed to  mine work. But pneumonia still  continued 
to claim a high proportion - as high as 75 per cent - of those Africans who died on 
the mines. Mortality ra tes  are blunt measures and conceal the effect  of death and 
disease on different age groups and African peoples. But overall, the greatest 
improvement i n  Kimberley's health record took place a f t e r  the reconstruction of the 
compound system i n  1903. The most important facet of t h i s  was the building of new 
dormitories with double the cubic space per man of the old huts. Before this time 
managerial ideology massaged shareholders9 sensibi l i t ies  over welfare, while 
perfecting a model of labour control i n  the closed compounds. 
A Model of Labour Control 
I n  1884, before the introduction of closed compounds, the De Beers INC began 
negotiations with the Cape government over the conditions under which they would 
build thei r  own convict stat ion fo r  the private use of convict labour i n  thei r  work 
force. In  January 1886 De Beers was granted a two-year contract fo r  the free 
service of 300 convicts i n  return fo r  which the company would maintain and 
discipline them i n  the convict stat ion they had buil t .  In  1888 the government 
renegotiated the contract and chaxged the company -/3 per day per man, a sum De Beers 
was glad to  pay. (51) By th i s  time De Beers was convinced that convicts were 
llsuperior t o  free labour i n  quantity, quality and rel iabil i ty".  (52) They showed 
thei r  confidence i n  convicts by increasing the number employed from 220 i n  1886 t o  
809 i n  1894, limited only by the number available and the requirements of the Public 
Works Department, which had a first option on convicts. In fact ,  De Beers found 
convict labour so satisfactory that convicts were employed un t i l  1932. (53) 
Believing i n  the superiority of convict labour, closed compounds were 
modelled on the De Beers Convict Station. "In these convict barracks, or branch 
gaol", wrote the Mine Inspector, "the perfection of the compound system m a y  be said 
t o  have been reached". (54) Compound managers t r ied  to  reproduce with free labour 
the advantages that  De Beers found with convict labour. There were essentially f ive 
advantages: improvement i n  efficiency; s e a t e r  discipline; cheaper labour; 
economies of scale i n  maintenance; and the prevention of diamond theft.  I n  time, 
free labour i n  compounds and prison labour i n  the convict stat ion became similar 
with "the onl important difference being that  between compulsory and voluntary 
service1l. (557 A look at the advantages of convict labour for  De Beers provides an 
outline of the compound model of labour control. 
The f i r s t  major advantage of convict labour l ay  i n  its efficiency. "It 
i s  by f a r  the best native labour we have", reported Gardner W i l l i a m s ,  "owing to  the 
fact  that  the convicts are obliged to  remain for a considerable length of time, 
while the free natives only work two months at a time." (56) Convicts had more time 
to become accustomed to the hard regime of working about a mine. But De Beers did 
not always have long-service convicts. Before 1888 De Beers Convict Station 
seldom accommodated i ts  fu l l  quota of prisoners. Competition with the Public Works 
Department forced De Beers to  take convicts sentenced to  l e s s  than two months' hard 
labour. Through th i s  redefinition of long service the s ta te  shuffled off into 
private hands the costs of catering for convicts i n  overcrowded prisons. (57) 
Kimberley prisons were overcrowded because of the enormous number of 
Africans who were convicted of pass offences. (58) They were sentenced to  up to  
one monthl S imprisonment with hard labour. The Kimberley gaol had been "designedf1 
for  400 convicts but i n  the l a t e  1880s held twice that number. (59) For many "raw" 
Africans thei r  introduction to  the diamond c i t y  was a t rans i t  through the Kimberley 
gaol to  the I)e Beers Convict Station. However, pass offenders did not become the 
trained mine labourers that De Beers required. In the 1890s, as the number of pass 
offenders and the prison population of Kimberley declined, De Beers looked to  other 
convict stations i n  the Cape Colony for labour. Over the decade De Beers drew the 
majority of i t s  loqpterm prisoners from the Transkei, Dordrecht and Middelburg. (60) 
The second advantage of convict labour lay  i n  the rigorous discipline and 
supervision that it w a s  possible to  impose on prisoners. Convicts were employed at 
the sorting tables and i n  breaking up the ground on the depositing floors (where 
the ground w a s  l a i d  out t o  weather a f te r  extraction from the mine). They were not 
employed underground, where even close supervision of free labourers w a s  impossible. 
Convicts worked 13 hours a day  i n  swmner and hours i n  winter, a labour time which 
was two hours longer than the hard labour regulations of the Prison Department, but 
no longer than the hours worked by free labour. They were controlled by government- 
appointed but company-paid Zulu guards, i n i t i a l l y  one to every f ive convicts, a 
ra t io  which widened to  one to  every ten convicts by 1891. (61) 
The relaxation i n  supervision was a product of the expansion i n  convict 
employment i n  the 1890s and the use of some incentives t o  aocompany the s t ick  of 
prison discipline. For even though discipline was t ight  there were always ways i n  
which convicts could sabotage the i r  gaolerls property. Sabotage w a s  made easier  by 
the high value of diamonds and the i r  often t iny size. Thus, a convict coming across 
a diamond while working on the floors or  at the sorting tables had it lfcompletely i n  
his power to revenge himself on h i s  employers ei ther by sweeping the diamonds from 
the sorting tables o r  by burying them i n  the so i l  with his heel ...". (62) To 
discourage this, convicts were paid rewards of -/3 t o  -/l0 per carat  on found 
diamonds. Some convicts even l e f t  thei r  periods of hard labour with more money 
than free labourers. A Parliamentary complaint led t o  a £15 limit per period of 
service being placed on this practice. (63) None the less ,  such a use of rewards 
was only possible i n  conjunction with t o t a l  control over workers isolated i n  
basrack-type accommodation. 
A third advantage of convict labour w a s  that  it w a s  cheaper than f ree  
labour. I n  1885, before the construction of the station, convict labourers were 
not much cheaper than free labour. But between 1887 and 1894 the cost of 
discipline, maintenance and rent  of convict labour declined from £58 t o  £39 10/- 
per man per year. Free labour cost £65 i n  1887 but declined i n  proportion to  
convict labour, so that i n  1894 it cost about £40 per man per year. This decline 
i n  free labour wages from a maximum of 30/- a week to  12/- a week i n  1894 w a s  a 
direct consequences of amalgamation, the introduction of compounds and the use of 
convict labour as a constant reserve of workers. Thus, not only w a s  convict labour 
i n i t i a l l y  cheaper than free labour, but it  also served t o  depress the wages of the 
l a t t e r .  (64) 
Although convicts were cheaper to  employ than free labour, thei r  
standards of maintenance were higher. I n  fact ,  the death ra te  at the De Beers 
Convict Station was 17.79 per thousand from 1891 to  1899, increasing t o  22.48 
from 1900 to  1905. (65) Convicts were issued thick jumpers, moleskin trousers, 
f e l t  hats, boots "when necessary", three blankets i n  winter and two i n  summer, and 
two sacks sewn together which formed a pillow and p d l i a s e  to  sleep on. A s  to diet ,  
meat was the crucial element as  hard labour could not be performed on a mealie meal 
(maize flour) diet; A t  the convict stat ion men ate  a pound of meat per day. I n  
addition, convicts were enti t led to a daily rat ion of a half-pound of bread, eighk 
ounces of meal, one pound of vegetables, one ounce of salt and a quaxt of soup. (66) 
The c&l.ity of rations i n  the De Beers Convict Station w a s  certainly 
superior to the fare i n  the Kimberley gaols. There, convicts sentenced to  over 
three months' hasd labour were on a l e s s  beneficial meat diet ,  while under that  
term they were confined to  a mealie meal diet. I n  1884 gaol rations were reduced 
because of the high price of food and 350 long-term convicts went on strike. In 
consequence, rations were reduced below subsistence and scurvy broke out. In  fact ,  
rations were so poor that  bad health kept a quarter of the hard labour convicts on 
the sick list. For De Beers, it was more economical to  feed i ts  convicts 
adequately. (67) 
A f ina l  advantage that  De Beers derived from convict labour lay  i n  the 
prevention of diamond theft.  Convicts were searched on entry t o  and ex i t  from the 
station. They stripped i n  the search houses and went naked to  the i r  ce l ls ,  where 
they assumed the i r  blankets. When thei r  term of imprisonment was over they were 
held fo r  f ive days, naked and with large leather gloves locked on the i r  hands. 
This was to  ensure that  they had not swallowed any diamonds i n  the hope of sel l ing 
them once they were free. There is  l i t t l e  doubt that  such restr ict ions,  together 
with rewards for  found diamonds, did reduce the extent of theft.  (68) 
It has consequently been argued that closed compounds were introduced to 
prevent diamond theft.  (69) Company managers and directors said t h i s  was the case 
i n  the 1880s and these historians have repeated t h i s  view. But, as has been 
suggested above, the model of convict labour presented other advantages to  compound 
managers and company directors. Moreover such a thef t  prevention view i s  too 
simple. A s  has been argued elsewhere (701, it abstracts one faator from a complex 
process of class struggle. It confuses a functional explanation with a causal one. 
It ignores the his tor ical  period i n  which closed compounds were introduced. It 
should be understood that closed compounds were introduced i n  the process of the 
development of underground mining, which required the investment of large amounts 
of capital. The rapid concentration and centralization of capital  that  underground 
mining required also dictated a more rigorous control of mip~ant labour, the 
unregulated scarcity and abundance of which had persistently hindered the process 
of capital accumulation. I n  fact ,  the closed compound system was the effective 
form i n  which the mine owners came to terms with migrant labour. 
The great value of closed compounds for  the mine owners lay  i n  the 
constant supply of mine labourers they provided. Here recontracting was the key to  
the growth of a pool of experienced mine workers. Contracts commonly ran for two 
months i n  De Beers and Bultfontein mines while they lasted for  three months i n  
Kimberley mine. Africans recontracted for  additional time i n  all the mines. I n  
Kimberley mine "the majority re-engage fo r  fkcther periods up to  nine months, i n  
some cases remaining fo r  eighteen monthsll. (71) This, i t  seemed, was evidence of 
"just  and reasonable" treatment of Africans. It should be remembered that  
recruitment was one of the ways of extending a migrant labourer's length of service 
on the mines. Since 1881, soon a f t e r  i ts  formation, the Kimberley Central had been 
recruiting Africans from Inhambane i n  Portuguese East Africa. (72) When the 
company inaugurated closed compaunds i n  April 1885, a l l  its underground workers were 
recruited on unusually long one-year contracts. Similarly, before De Beers closed 
i t s  open compound i n  1886 "arrangementsw were made with Chiefs i n  Basutoland, 
B e c h u d a n d  and the Transvaal "for a continuous supply of labourers1'. (73) 
Recruitment generally led t o  longer contracts as a resul t  of the distances of the 
recruiting areas from Kimberley or  from delayed s ix  monthly, rather than weekly, 
wage payment. Recruitment continued over the 1890s, becoming prominent during the 
labour shortage a f t e r  the South African W a r  and se t t l ing down to l 0  per cent of the 
work force i n  the f i r s t  decade of the twentieth century. (74) Thus, recruitment 
played a part i n  f i l l i n g  the compo.lmds and i n  spinning out the length of a contract. 
Lack of choice over recontracting also played a part  i n  keeping up the 
compound complement. Between 1885 and 1891 no compound African was freely 
contracted. Compound managers sent a l i s t  of names to the Registrar of Natives, 
who renewed the labour contracts and sent them back to  the compounds. "Those whose 
time has expired", reported one compound manager, "and who don't wish to  re- 
contract are discharged." (75) But matters were not that  simple. Closed compounds 
enabled companies to regulate the i r  labour supplies. When there were others to  
replace time-expired labourers d1 was well. But when competition from the Gold 
Fields became too strong or  seasonal fluctuations too sharp, Africans were coerced 
in to  remaining i n  the compounds. And even a f t e r  1891 when the Registrar was 
allowed t o  perform his duties inside the compounds, there w a s  l i t t l e  he could do to  
prevent management coercion. 
Evidence of coercion lay i n  the lwge  numbers of compounded Africans who 
remained uncontracted. In the largest  compound, the De Beers West Eind compound, 
which increased i ts  complement from 400 Africans i n  1886 to  2,900 i n  1895 (over half 
the De Beers work force), at l eas t  one-third to one half of the labourers were 
continually uncontracted. (76) A labour contract had always been a mixed blessing 
t o  Africans. Breaking a contract on the part of a labourer was a criminal offence. 
But it  did offer  some protection against employers. Legally contracts came to an 
end, at which point servants could withdraw the i r  labour from one employer to  offer  
it  to  another or  some could leave fo r  home. But without a contract, recourse to  the 
Registrar was impossible. Africans were incarcerated i n  compounds i n  a legal  no- 
=' S-land. 
Moreover, lack of a contract could mean no work. For more Africans were 
compounded than were required fo r  a f u l l  work force. The Kimberley Central, i n  the 
l a t e  18808, fo r  example, generally employed only 1,000 out of the 1,200 Africans i n  
the i r  compounds. (77) A t  the same time De Beers men worked a four-day week. "To 
work 900 men", commented the compound manager, "we want 1,400 or 1,500 men for  
natives wont t stand the whole week with the white miner." (78) Thus, with the 
development of underground mining it was crucial to have a constant supply of labour. 
Closed compounds not only provided the supply but also a reserve pool of labour to  
f a l l  back on i n  times of str ikes,  disasters or  periods of social tension between 
African miners and European supervisors. 
There is  ambiguous evidence as to  whether compounds contained or 
exacerbated tension between white miners/contractors and black workers. With the 
introduction of underground mining, the labour process w a s  fundamentally changed. 
Skilled white miners working with teams of twenty or more Africans were given 
contracts to  excavate a s e t  number of loads of blue ground a day. (79) A s  close I 
supervision was impossible underground, piece-work wages, as opposed to time-work 
wages i n  the open mine, were introduced for  the f i r s t  time. Competition between 
contractors fo r  bonuses put even greater pressure on African miners i n  experimental 
underground workings. Such competitive pressure on hand-drillers or  loaders led to I 
l great conflict i n  the mines. I n  1890 the situation underground w a s  so bad that the 
I Mine Inspector feared an African uprising i n  De Beers mine and the murder of white 
I supervisors. Contractors did not bother to  charge Africans with assault or  
disobedience as conviction on the evidence of African witnesses was improbable. 
This is  not to  suggest that violence was all directed a t  white miners. There were 
~ 
numerous white assaults on black workers. But, on balance, underground workings 
provided a refuge from mine authorities and created immense discipline problems for 
overseers and contractors. (80) 
l 
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Above ground i n  closed compounds the situation was reversed. Compound 
management and compound guards held all the cudgels of coercion i n  the i r  hands. 
They usurped the judicial functions of punishment reserved to  the s t a t e  i n  the 
Master and Servants Acts. They had the i r  "own way of treating natives" and adopted 
thei r  own "method of maintaining order". (81) Almost all compounds practised a 
system of fines. Fines were inf l ic ted to  protect companies Ifagainst the natural 
impulse of human nature, white and black to do as l i t t l e  work as possible and get 
drunk whenever the occasion offers". (821 
When fines fa i led to  discipline,more drast ic measures were taken by 
compound management. I n  1894 there was a dispute over work and wages i n  the 
Wesselton compound which "grew to  such proportions that  a r i o t  ensued, during which 
the natives were f i red on by the police and others, with the resul t  that  three of 
them were ki l led  and seven wounded". (83) This was an example of extreme compound 
tension. But most disputes that ended i n  violence were over work conditions. 
Africans were well aware of the poss ibi l i t ies  of underground disasters and refused t o  
work i n  dangerous stopes or  tunnels. Although workers could remain unemployed and , . 
unpaid i n  the compounds, the refusal to  work when commanded w a s  regarded as a 
punishable offence. And it was an offence dealt with by compound guards and not the 
Resident Magistrate. I n  one case, Charles Riordan, Head Guard of the De Beers West 
End compound, flogged a team of twenty-two Africans fo r  refusing to  work, confined 
them i n  a detention ce l l  fo r  f ive days and then dismissed them. The evidence of 
this thrashing - "the scars or  wounds were still  raw and about four inches i n  
length" (84) - was still  apparent a week la ter .  Such treatment gave the De Beers 
- ~ 
compounds "a bad name amongst the natives1'. (85) 
Despite the ins t i tu t ional  coercion of the compound system, mine 
management argued that  they improved the moral and social welfare of Africans. The 
temptations of liquor and sex i n  the townships w a s  traded i n  for  a larger wage packet 
at the end of a period of service.. Even the Chiefs were pleased "because the boys 
take home sums of money". (86) But were Africans able t o  save more than i n  open 
compounds? Compound managers estimated that  Africans saved from twenty-five to forty 
per cent more than before. One manager claimed that the average saving a f t e r  s ix  
months service was £14. 10/-. (87) While it seems clear the possibil i ty of saving 
increased, it  i s  also clear that  the possibil i ty of e d n g  declined. 'Pkrus, while 
£14 was indeed a handsome saving, such a saving, a31 other things being equal, could 
have been effected i n  half the time i n  the era  of open compounds. Here, welfare w a s  
a side-effect of the p r i m  purpose of closed compounds, which was to  extend the 
length of a worker's spell  of labour. 
Closed compounds were an early model of labour control for an 
industrializing South Africa. They bridged the gap between two modes of production. 
The laws of motion of a capitalist enclave in Kimberley began to extend its 
control over a labour supplying, pre-capitalist hinterland. The mine owners had 
struggled to control their supply of labour throughout the 1870s and 1880s. On the 
one hand, they wanted experienced labourers in their mines. On the other hand, 
they did not want an organized working class in their town. It was this 
contradiction that was bridged by the closed compound system. "Raw natives" became 
accustomed to mine work and not a threat to European property, liberty and security. 
This bridge was not one that was simply built by urban reorganization. It was 
crucially constructed by changing social and political relations in African 
Chiefdoms in the countryside. The erosion of chiefly control over migrants had 
been a slow process. In 1888 Arthur David of the Bultfontein Mining Company noted 
that Africans had worked for his company for seven or eight years. (88) This group 
of semi-skilled Africans made up the nucleus of an African working class in 
Kimberley. 
In the 1890s the compound system led to the proletarianization of unskilled 
mine labourers. By this time, at least, a significant number of Africans had been 
pushed permanently over the bridge into the mine economy. In 1902 Gardner Williams 
of De Beers wrote that some Africans had remained in his compounds continuously for 
ten years. (89) However, the normal pattern of life for the resident miner was an 
alternation between mine labour and periods of "resting" in the locations. 
Location landlords lived well off miners who rented rooms to recuperate their 
strength for two to six weeks before returning to the compounds. (90) Thus, the 
oscillation between location and compound kept up the complement of the De Beers 
work force. 
Conclusion 
Kimberleyqs compounds were more models of labour control than of social welfare 
before 1903. And the reason for this lay not so much in the penny-pinching 
economics of mining companies as in the historical position that diamond mining 
occupied in South Africa's industrial revolution. Diamond mining began that 
industrial revolution and had to prise a work force out of a pre-capitalist rural 
hinterland ruled by independent African chiefs. "It may well be", wrote Perrings, 
that where an industry did not have the means to 
exercise the necessary regulative controls over 
labour in the supplying areas, controls at the 
work place (in the compounds) were of heightened 
significance. (91) 
Controls in the compounds were of even greater significance when production was 
monopolized by one leviathan company like De Beers Consolidated Mines. Not only did 
this facilitate a control over the labour supply but it also minimized African 
organization against exploitation in the mines. Kimberley had a more totalitarian 
system of labour control than imitators on mines further to the north. Kimberley's 
compounds differed from those on the Rand and in Southern Rhodesia in being closed, 
whereas they, in varying degrees, were not. But the greater compound self- 
sufficiency that this entailed in Kimberley did not lead to markedly higher standards 
of accommodation, diet and health-care until after 1903. Kimberley's compounds were 
as bad as those mine compounds on the Rand, in Southern Rhodesia and in Katanga in 
encouraging a death rate of enormous proportions. And that death rate has been 
hidden for far too long under the justification of compound philanthropy and the 
greater weight of mine owners' claims to protection against diamond theft. 
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